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THE LEAD-BASED PAINT ABATEMENT REPAIR &
MAINTENANCE STUDY IN BALTIMORE: HISTORIC
FRAMEWORK AND STUDY DESIGN
JOANNE POLLAK, J.D.*
The tragedy of lead paint exposure for young children has continued in this
country for over a century, despite widespread knowledge of the danger of lead
additives. During the first half of the 20th century, while almost every other
country in the western world was banning the use of lead in interior house paint,
the paint companies in the United States were promoting its use.1 The paint
companies' promotion included advertising which made children a central element
of their campaigns even though lead's potentially devastating effects on the
development of young children were well known.2
The problem stems from the fact that although lead in interior house paint
improves durability, 3 when taken internally, it may affect the central nervous
system leading to neurobehavioral problems and learning deficiencies in young
children.4 The lead in paint gets to children in several ways: from chips of paint
* Ms. Pollak serves as the Vice President and General Counsel for The Johns Hopkins Health System
Corporation, The Johns Hopkins Hospital and Johns Hopkins Medicine, a collaboration of The Johns
Hopkins Health System and The Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine. In her roles at Hopkins,
Ms. Pollak has joint responsibility for legal advice to the School of Medicine Institutional Review
Boards with respect to human subjects research.
1. Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, Cater to the Children: The Role of The Lead Industry in a
Public Health Tragedy, 1900-1955, 90.1 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH, 36, 36-37 (January 2000). As early
as 1848 there was knowledge of the dangers of lead poisoning. See id. at 36, 44 n.8. In the first decade
of the 20th century extensive "scientific literature on the subject accumulated in Australia, England and
the United States." Id. at 36. In 1922, the Third International Labor Conference of the League of
Nations recommended the banning of white lead for use in interior paints, and by 1931, most European
countries had banned its use. See id. at 37. Although there were calls for the banning of the use of lead
in interior house paint in the United States as early as 1913, the Lead Industries Association (LIA)
conducted an extensive campaign to assure the public that lead in paint was safe and specifically made
children a central focus of an extensive marketing campaign. See id. at 37-41. The LIA disparaged
clinical research demonstrating the dangers of lead paint and convinced homeowners and local and state
governments to expand the use of interior lead paint. See id. at 42-43. During the 1940's and 1950's,
some local and state health departments sought to warn the public about lead's dangers, and even
though California in 1945 and Maryland in 1949 passed statutes requiring labeling regulations for lead
paint, the LIA was instrumental in securing the Maryland law's repeal in 1950. See id. at 43.
2. See id. at 38-40.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, COMPREHENSIVE AND WORKABLE PLAN FOR THE ABATEMENT OF LEAD-
BASED PAINT IN PRIVATELY OWNED HOUSING: REPORT TO CONGRESS, at 1-1 to 1-2 (1990).
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF LEAD POISONING tN CHILDREN tN THE
UNITED STATES: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1, 111-7 and IV 1-25 (July 1988); and U.S. DEP'T OF HUD,
supra note 3, at xvi-xvii, 2-1 to 2-5.
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that fall on the floor from peeling wall paint or when windows are moved up and
down, 5 and from lead dust that falls from the painted walls to the floors and
furniture where very young children crawl and play.6 These paint chip flakes and
dust may make their way into children's mouths when they naturally put their
fingers in their mouths.7 This flaking and dust problem is exacerbated when
children live in poorly maintained homes, often located in low income areas, where
the homes contain lead-tainted paint.8
It was not until 1978 that the Consumer Products Safety Commission
prohibited the use of lead in house paint.9 Yet the overwhelming legacy of homes
filled with lead paint remained in both large cities and small communities. Since
the dangers of lead paint in existing old housing stock were well known, what
would or could be society's response? Would or could all existing housing be tom
down to build new homes? Or could society find ways to make existing houses
safer?
This article explores an attempt at the second response and what happened to
researchers at the Kennedy Krieger Institute (Kennedy Krieger), a non-profit
institute, when they tried to evaluate ways to make existing houses with lead paint
safer for young children living in those houses. Their 1992 research study, the
Repair and Maintenance Study, became the subject of the recent Maryland Court
of Appeals decisions in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute.'0  The case
consolidated the petitions of two plaintiffs who alleged that Kennedy Krieger had
not been timely in reporting dust lead levels to the families or in warning them of
5. See U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, CTR FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, PREVENTING LEAD
POISONING IN YOUNG CHILDREN 17-19 (1991).
6. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at xvi.
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, supra note 5, at 18.
8. U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at 2-19, 3-10 and 3-15.
9. 16 C.F.R. § 1303.1 (2002). Although some cities adopted laws or regulations prohibiting the
use of lead in paint prior to 1978 (such as Baltimore for public housing in 1951), between the 1950's
and 1977, paints with lead in excess of the then voluntary limits for lead in paint were produced. See
U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, supra note 4, at 1-26, IX-5 and IX-7.
10. Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute, Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001), reconsideration denied,
(Oct. 11, 2001). The court had harsh criticism for the design of the study inferring that by allowing
families with young children to live in homes that were not completely lead free and measuring the
effects of living in those homes, Kennedy Krieger had engaged in unethical behavior. See id. at 848.
This extraordinary conclusion, based on a very incomplete record, was coupled with a holding that
parents may not consent to participation by their children in research if there is any risk in the study.
See id. at 858. In the court's order denying the request for reconsideration, the court clarified that the
only conclusion that it reached as a matter of law was that, on the record currently before it, summary
judgment was improperly granted. Id. at 861. The court further clarified that any risk in the context of
parental consent "meant any articulable risk beyond the minimal kind of risk that is inherent in any
endeavor." Id. at 862. Therefore, although the court held that parents could not consent to a child's
participation in research if there were any risk to the child, the statement of the court in its order makes
it clear that this holding is dicta and that this dicta is amended to adopt, in substance, the minimal risk
definition under 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2001).
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the hazards of lead in paint.' l The court heard the matter on appeal from a
summary decision in Kennedy Krieger's favor in the lower court. 2 The only issue
on appeal was whether that summary judgment had been properly granted. 13 There
had been no trial on the facts in the lower court, including no exploration of the
study design, the consent documents or the nature of the repair and maintenance
measures in the homes. 14  Consequently, the record before the court was
overwhelmingly incomplete. Notwithstanding this limited record, however, the
court came to the conclusion that the study was flawed and placed children at risk
for lead poisoning.' 5 What, in fact, was flawed was both the court's analysis and
its rush to judgment on a thin record.
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, there was a national crisis in lead paint
poisoning, and it was critical that researchers explore methods that could, in the
absence of any national or local mandate to fully abate homes with lead paint, or
build a sufficient supply of new homes, reduce lead in homes in a safe and
effective manner.' 6  The Repair and Maintenance Study was such a study.
Contrary to the conclusion in Grimes that the study put children at risk, the facts
show that the children in the study were in housing environments that did not put
them at increased risk for lead poisoning, and, in fact, the study offered the
expectation of decreased risk of lead poisoning. This article outlines the factual
basis for the study, including the historical framework in which the study was
proposed and carried out.
I. THE LEAD PAINT SITUATION AFTER 1978
The banning of lead paint in 1978, although a positive development, did not
by itself eliminate the reality of all existing housing stock in the United States
containing lead paint. Lead paint poisoning continued, and still continues, to be
one of the most significant environmental health problems for children in the
United States. 17 Children across the nation were poisoned by lead paint, and public
health officials and federal agencies were anxious to find the best way to address
11. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 818.
12. See id.
13. Id.
14. Court Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Institute
Inc, 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001) (No. 24-C-99-000925).
15. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 848.
16. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, supra note 4, at XI-7.
17. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON ENVTL. HEALTH RISKS AND SAFETY RISKS TO CHILDREN,
ELIMINATING CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: A FEDERAL STRATEGY TARGETING LEAD PAINT
HAZARDS, 11-13 (2000); Steven Waldman, Lead and Your Kids: Disturbing New Evidence about the
Threat to Their Health: How to Protect Them, NEWSWEEK, July 15, 1991, at 43.
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this significant public health problem. 18  Building new homes using paint
manufactured after 1978 would create houses free of lead based paint, although
children in cities would still be exposed to lead in soil, drinking water, and other
homes and buildings where lead was present. 19 The availability of new homes
varied throughout the United States, particularly in the older inner cities of the
country, like Baltimore, where approximately 95% of the housing stock was built
before the 1978 ban on lead in house paint.2 0 The shortage of post-1978 housing
was more acute in low-income neighborhoods where housing with lead paint was
often in poor condition, and thus, put children at high risk of lead poisoning from
flaking paint and lead dust.2'
Children in Baltimore in the early 1990's were at very high-risk for lead
poisoning compared to the nation as a whole. This risk factor is measured by
testing a child's blood lead elevation, which is reported as the number of
micrograms of lead per deciliter of blood or pg/dL.2  The rate of blood lead
elevations in Baltimore City at this time was 10-15 times higher than the national
rate. 23 Also, the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) had identified
certain high-risk neighborhoods in Baltimore City where as many as 60% of tested
children had blood lead elevations that were above 10 [.g/dL.24 According to the
18. See U.S. DHMH, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE ELIMINATION OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING,
38-44 (February, 1991). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at 6-10 to 6-12; U.S. EPA,
STRATEGY FOR REDUCING LEAD EXPOSURES, at 13, 18 (1991).
19. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, supra note 5, at 17-22.
20. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICK TABLES, DP-5. HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS: 1990,
GEOGRAPHIC AREA: BALTIMORE CITY, MARYLAND, at
http://quickfacts.census.gov/cgi-bin/cntyQuickLinks?245 10 (last visited Oct. 14, 2002); See generally
U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at 3-6, 3-32.
21. See U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at 2-16, 2-24.
22. See e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, supra note 5, at 1.
23. MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, CHILDHOOD BLOOD LEVELS SURVEILLANCE IN MD., 1997 ANNUAL
REPORT, at tbl. 3 [hereinafter MDE 1997 ANNUAL REPORT]; MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, CHILDHOOD
BLOOD LEAD SURVEILLANCE IN MD. 1993-1999 SUMMARY, at tbl. 5, Children 0-72 mos. [hereinafter
MDE SUMMARY]; MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, LEAD POISONING PREVENTION PROGRAM: CHILDHOOD
LEAD REGISTRY, NO. AND PERCENT OF CHILDREN 0-72 MOS. SCREENED FOR LEAD POISONING WITH
BLOOD LEAD LEVELS >10, >15, and >20 jig/dL., BALT. CITY ZIP CODES 1992-1995 [hereinafter MDE
0-72 MOS.]; MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, RESIDENTIAL ZIP CODES OF CHILDREN AGED 12-36 MOS. WITH
BLOOD LEAD LEVELS >10 jLg /dL, BALT. CITY, 1992-1995 [hereinafter MDE 12-36 MOS.].
24. MDE 0-72 MOS., supra note 23 at tbl. 3 ; MDE 12-36 MOS., supra note 23 at 1. See, e.g.,
MDE SUMMARY, supra note 23; MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, BALT. CITY NEIGHBORHOODS AT HIGHEST
RISK FOR CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING, CHILDHOOD LEAD REGISTRY (1992) [Hereinafter MDE
NEIGHBORHOODS]; MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, LEAD POISONING PREVENTION PROGRAM,
DISTRIBUTION OF CHILDREN AGE 6 AND UNDER BY BLOOD LEAD LEVEL (VENIPUNCTURE ONLY) BY
CENSUS TRACT: BALT. CITY, 1992 [hereinafter MDE 6 AND UNDER]; MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T LEAD
POISONING PREVENTION PROGRAM, BALT. CITY CENSUS TRACTS WITH THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF
KNOWN CASES OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING 20 jsg/dL IN 1992 [hereinafter MDE HIGHEST
PERCENTAGE]; MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T LEAD POISONING PREVENTION PROGRAM, BALTIMORE CITY
CENSUS TRACTS HAVING SHOWN THE HIGHEST NUMBER OF KNOWN CASES OF CHILDHOOD LEAD
POISONING 10 ag /dL IN 1992 [hereinafter MDE HIGHEST NUMBER]; See also Bait. City Health Dep't,
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Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 1991 guidelines, a blood lead
level above 10 ig /dL could pose a risk to children.25 The rate of blood lead
elevations in these high-risk areas was 20-30 times higher than the national rate.26
Not only did as many as 60% of tested children in identified high-risk
neighborhoods have blood lead elevations above 10 jig/dL, the CDC's threshold
level of concern, but 15% to 22% of tested children had blood levels at twice that
level, i.e., above 20 jig /dL. 27 This rate was 30-45 times higher than the national
rate.28 In addition to the known levels of toxicity, a problem existed with
identifying new cases. MDE data indicated that less than half of Baltimore City
children were screened for lead levels by health care providers during the 1990,s,29
presumably including children in many of the highest-risk neighborhoods.
Thus, it was an accepted fact that children were being poisoned in older
Baltimore housing neighborhoods. Yet despite this, the availability of affordable
new housing or comprehensively lead-abated homes in the poor areas of the City
was almost non-existent. 30 Given the high prevalence of lead painted houses and
the slow pace of housing replacement, it was recognized that without a substantial
subsidy for new or improved homes, children would continue to occupy older
houses with lead hazards for decades to come.
Kennedy Krieger is a non-profit institute dedicated to the treatment of
children with developmental diseases and disabilities. Over many decades, both
before and after 1978, Kennedy Krieger's lead prevention and treatment program
treated hundreds of lead exposed children who came to its clinical program for
treatment after they were identified as lead poisoned. 31 The data showed that these
and other Baltimore City children had been poisoned in the same older, lead-
painted houses in the same older neighborhoods and blocks of Baltimore City.32
Kennedy Krieger and society at large were faced with the reality that:
A New Housing Regulation, XXVII BALT. HEALTH NEWS 113, 114-115 (August-September, 1951)
(showing the incidence of lead poisoning in Baltimore children from 1931-1951).
25. U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, supra note 5, at 1.
26. See generally MDE 1997 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 23; MDE 0-72 MOS., supra note 23;
MDE 12-36 MOS., supra note 23.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See MD. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, CHILDHOOD LEAD REGISTRY, OCCURRENCE OF LEAD
POISONING IN CHILDREN 0-72 Mos., REPORT FOR 1/94-12/94; MDE SUMMARY, supra note 23.
30. Telephone Interview with Barry Mankowitz, President, City Homes, Inc. (August 8, 2002).
31. E-mail from Dr. Gary Goldstein, President, Kennedy Krieger Institute, to Joanne Pollak, Vice
President & General Counsel, Johns Hopkins Medicine (Nov. 1, 2002, 14:24:00 EST) (on file with
author).
32. See Bait. City Health Dep't, supra note 24; MDE 6 AND UNDER, supra note 24; MDE HIGHEST
PERCENTAGE, supra note 24; MDE HIGHEST NUMBER, supra note 24.
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" there was an acute shortage of lead paint free housing, particularly for
low income/high-risk populations;
33
* society had not committed the resources to abating lead paint hazards
in these private, older homes;
34
" efforts to identify and reduce environmental sources of lead in the
home were made only after children were found to be lead poisoned;35
* there were no laws or regulations requiring landlord-initiated
preventive maintenance to reduce lead hazards in rental units;36 and
* because of these factors, children would continue to occupy high-risk
lead painted houses for decades to come.37
Dr. J. Julian Chisolm, Director of Kennedy Krieger's lead prevention and
treatment program, and his colleague, Dr. Mark Farfel, understood the acute need
to find safe, effective and practical ways to control residential lead exposures that
could be applied on a widespread basis.3t They understood that these ways were
needed in order to help society prevent lead poisoning from occurring in the first
place so that new generations of children would not become poisoned.39 Their
goal was to provide a scientifically sound basis for prevention policies and
practices.4 °
II. THE EARLY WORK OF DRS. CHISOLM AND FARFEL
Drs. Chisolm and Farfel conducted research to determine and document safe
and effective methods for the control of lead paint hazards in homes. In the 1980's
they secured research funding from various federal agencies, including the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to perform several studies, the goal of
which was to document and evaluate the effectiveness of some commonly used
33. See U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at 3-6, 3-32; LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARD REDUCTION
AND FINANCING TASK FORCE, PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: CONTROLLING LEAD HAZARDS IN THE
NATION'S HOUSING (June, 1995).
34. See U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at xxi.
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, supra note 5, at 2-3.
36. Maryland's landlord law affecting preventive lead reduction activities was passed in 1994,
with regulations effective in 1996. The Lead Poisoning Prevention Program Act, MD. CODE ANN.,
[ENVIR.], §§6-801-852 (2001); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26 § 16.02.03 (1996).
37. See U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at 1-2.
38. See J. Julian Chisolm, Jr., M.D., Removal of Lead Paint from Old Housing: The Need for a
New Approach, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 236, 236-37 (1986); Mark R. Farfel, Sc.D. & J. Julian
Chisolm, Jr., M.D., Health and Environmental Outcomes of Traditional and Modified Practices for
Abatement of Residential Lead-Based Paint, 80 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1240, 1243-44 (1990).
39. See Chisolm, supra note 38.
40. See Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 38, at 1240-44 (comparing abatement procedures and
making recommendations for improvements).
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lead abatement methods. 41 Through Kennedy Krieger's work, and the work of
others, it was discovered that certain methods of removing lead in paint and dust
were actually dangerous to humans.42 For example, it was discovered that the use
of do-it-yourself heat guns, open flame torches and sanding equipment for
removing lead paint actually increased the level of lead dust, and consequently,
lead poisoning in children and workers.43 Documentation of these hazards was
critical to the development of more protective practices and policies in this area.
Drs. Chisolm and Farfel and others also performed studies on homes to
determine if alternative lead hazard reduction procedures worked to reduce lead
levels in house dust. 4 They found that several methods such as encapsulating lead
paint surfaces, replacing lead painted components (e.g., windows), removing
deteriorated and chipped paint, making surfaces smooth and more easy to clean
(e.g., floor coverings) and professional cleaning with special vacuums and wet
washing methods were successful in significantly reducing lead dust levels in these
homes. 5 The studies documented significant reduction, but not total elimination
of lead dust through use of these methods.46
Using the techniques identified by these and other research studies, Baltimore
City began a lead reduction program in the late 1980's in consultation with
Kennedy Krieger. Dozens of homes were improved through this City program.47
Unfortunately, the cost of this comprehensive lead abatement often exceeded the
market value of older houses in poor neighborhoods.48
41. See generally Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 38; Evan Charney et al., Childhood Lead
Poisoning: A Controlled Trial of the Effect of Dust-Control Measures on Blood Lead Levels, 309 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1089, 1089 (1983).
42. Chisolm, supra note 38, at 236; Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 38, at 1240, 1242-44; Press
Release, U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, CPSC Warns About Hazards of Do-It-Yourself
Removal of Lead-Based Paint (Feb. 1989) available at
http://www.cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PUBS/5055.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2002). See generally, A.
Fishbein et al., Lead Poisoning from Do-It- Yourself Heat Guns -Removing Lead-Based Paint: Report of
Two Cases, 24 ENVTL. RES. 425 (1981); Y. Amitai et al., Hazards of Deleading Homes of Children
with Lead Poisoning, 141 Am. J. Diseases of Child. 758 (1987).
43. Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 38, at 1243-44. See generally Fischbein et al., supra note 42.
44. See generally Mark R. Farfel & J. Julian Chisolm, Jr., An Evaluation of Experimental
Practices for Abatement of Residential Lead-Based Paint: Report on a Pilot Project, 55 ENVTL RES.
199 (1991); Mark R. Farfel et al., The Longer Term Effectiveness of Residential Lead Paint Abatement,
66 ENVTL RES. 217 (1994).
45. Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 44, at 203-09; Farfel et al., supra note 44, at 217, 219-20.
46. Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 44, at 203-10; Farfel et al., supra note 44, at 219-20.
47. Farfel et al., supra note 44, at 218-20; See generally BALT. CITY DEP'T OF HOUS. AND CMTY.
DEV. & CITY BUILDERS (Lead Paint Abatement Project: July 1, 1987-Dec. 31, 1990) (describing the
abatement process and accomplishments of a pilot project) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law
& Policy).
48. LEAD-BASED PAINT HAZARD REDUCTION & FIN. TASK FORCE, PUB. No. HUD-1547-LBP 3, 6
PUTING THE PIECES TOGETHER: CONTROLLING LEAD HAZARDS IN THE NATION'S HOUSING (1995).
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III. THE REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE STUDY
In the late 1980's and early 1990's, recognizing that full abatement of all
housing with lead based paint was extraordinarily expensive and unlikely to be
funded in the immediate future, several federal agencies called for research
regarding the effectiveness of various lead reduction strategies.49 Drs. Chisolm
and Farfel proposed research regarding lead reduction methods that might yield
commensurate reduction in lead dust in the homes, which could be applied on a
widespread basis, and, which in turn, would prevent or reduce the risk of lead
poisoning in children.5 ° In 1990, the EPA, through its Office of Pollution
Prevention and Toxics, issued a work assignment to Battelle Memorial Institute,
which in turn subcontracted with Kennedy Krieger, directing the design of the
Lead-Based Paint Abatement and Repair and Maintenance Study in Baltimore.
51
The purpose of the study was to evaluate the short and long-term effectiveness of
various levels of repair and maintenance in reducing exposure to lead in the
home. The EPA's work assignment stated that:
Lead has been identified as a significant cause of
neurobehavioral and learning deficits in young children
which are long lasting, if not indeed permanent. The recent
report to Congress by the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry (July, 1988) points out that lead in existing
residential paint, household dust and soil now constitutes the
major source of high lead exposure in U.S. children. This
study would provide a means of evaluating new policies and
practices in Maryland for abating lead in residential paint and
dust.53
49. U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at xv, xvi, xxii; U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, supra note 4, at XI-3
- XI-5.
50. Letter from J. Julian Chisolm, Jr., M.D., Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins School of
Medicine, & Mark Farfel, Se.D., Director of Lead Poisoning Prevention, Kennedy Kreiger Inst.,
Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene & Public Health, to Robert Elias, Ph.D., EPA
(Sept. 28, 1989) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
51. Contract for Design of LBP Abatement, R&M Study, Contract No. 68-D8-0115, May 14,
1990, U.S. EPA-Battelle Memorial Inst. (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy)
[hereinafter EPA-Battelle Contract]; Subcontract for Design of Lead-Based Paint Abatement and R&M
Study in Baltimore, Subcontract No. W-8300(1566)-1628, June 25, 1990, Battelle Memorial Inst.-
Kennedy Krieger Inst. (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy) [hereinafter Battelle-KKI
Subcontract].
52. BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., FINAL QUALITY ASSURANCE PROJECT PLAN FOR
KENNEDY KRIEGER INSTITUTE: LEAD-BASED PAINT ABATEMENT & REPAIR & MAINTENANCE STUDY I
(July 22, 1992).
53. EPA-Battelle Contract, supra note 51 at 2.
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With the EPA's supervision and approval, researchers at Kennedy Krieger
designed a research study to investigate lead hazard reduction in existing homes.54
The study included approximately 75 structurally sound homes in Baltimore's
high-risk neighborhoods that had not received any lead reduction improvements
(unimproved homes).55 Through the efforts of the landlords of these homes who
took advantage of a State loan program, these homes underwent various
combinations of lead abatement improvements called repair and maintenance or
R&M.56  (The unimproved homes that received improvement under the State's
loan program were called R&M homes and the study was called the R&M Study.)
About two-thirds of the R&M houses were located in the top 20% of census tracts
in Baltimore City in terms of risk of lead exposure. 57  The R&M Study was
intended to measure the relative effectiveness of various combinations of
prevention methods and strategies, 58 all of which had been shown to substantially
reduce residential lead dust exposure in a safe manner, and, therefore, in turn, to
reduce the risk of lead poisoning.
59
There were three types of R&M homes (Levels I, II and III) and each level
received different types of lead reduction measures previously tested in occupied
or vacant houses.60 All R&M homes also received prescribed common measures,
such as removal of deteriorated interior paint, professional cleaning, provision of
resident education, cleaning kits, door mats, and ongoing house observation.
6 1
Although each of the different preventive methods used in the three levels of
houses had been used in one of the prior studies referenced above, and had been
shown to significantly reduce lead dust levels, the exact combination of the
methods used in each level had not been tested previously.
62
In addition to the R&M homes, the Study included two groups of homes to be
used as comparisons to the R&M homes.63 One group of homes had been
54. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52.
55. See BAITELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 2, §2.1.
56. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 1, §2.0; 55, tbl. 2.6; 58, tbl. 2.8;
See generally Balt. City Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev. & City Builders, supra note 47, at 1-2
(describing the process by which property owners applied for abatement funding).
57. E-mail from Dr. Mark Farfel, Associate Professor, Kennedy Krieger Institute and Department
Health Policy and Management, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health , to Joanne Pollak,
Vice President & General Counsel, Johns Hopkins Medicine (Nov. 1, 2002, 16:36:00 EST) (on file with
author).
58. MARK FARFEL, RESEARCH PROJECT NOTIFICATION I (No. 91-05-02-01) (1992) (on file with
the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy) [hereinafter Research Project Notification].
59. See Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 44, at 203-10; Farfel et al., supra note 44, at 219-20.
60. BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 53-59, §2.3.1.6. See also Farfel &
Chisolm, supra note 44 at 203-210; Farfel et al., supra note 44 at 217, 219-20.
61. Id.; see also Research Project Notification, supra note 58, at attachment 1.
62. Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 44, at 203-10; Farfel et al., supra note 44 at 217, 219-20; See
generally BATrELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST, supra note 52 at 50 (stating that procedural revisions
would be made as needed in homes where treatments prove ineffective).
63. BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 66-67, §2.3.1.6.
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comprehensively abated under a Baltimore City lead abatement program in the late
1980's before the R&M study was implemented.64 The second group of homes
had been built after 1978, the year when the federal government banned the use of
65lead in house paint. Notably, and in direct contrast to the negative comparisons
made in the Grimes case,66 the study did not include a control group of unimproved
homes where there were no interventions to reduce lead in dust and paint.67
IV. ENROLLMENT OF FAMILIES IN THE R&M STUDY
To carry out the R&M Study in these five categories of homes, two different
enrollment processes were followed, depending on whether the homes were
occupied or not occupied.68
A. Occupied R&M Homes:
From the prior studies, it was known that certain lead reduction measures
could be performed safely so long as there were precautions in place to protect
occupants, their belongings, and the workers.69 Specifically, it was believed that
the less intensive types of interventions that were going to be used in the study's
occupied homes, such as the placement of textured floor mats, sealing floors with
sealants, removal of loose and peeling paint, installing aluminum caps on window
wells and other related treatments,7 ° were safe to perform in occupied homes.7
The majority of the R&M homes included in the study were owned by City
Homes, Inc., a non-profit corporation whose mission was to operate and
maintain decent and affordable rental housing in low income urban neighborhoods.
City Homes and other private landlords who participated in the study identified
what they believed to be structurally sound homes that might be candidates for the
intervention. 73  City Homes also had a pre-existing lead poisoning prevention
policy that included tenant education and making their improved units available to
families with lead poisoned children. 74 As part of the pre-enrollment activities,
64. Id.
65. See id.
66. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 816-17 (Md. 2001).
67. BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 50, §2.3.1.6.
68. Id. at 60-67.
69. Chisolm, supra note 38; Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 38, at 1244; Press Release, U.S.
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, CPSC Warns About Hazards of Do-It-Yourself Removal of Lead-
Based Paint (Feb. 1989), available at http://www.cpsc.gov/CPSCPUB/PUBS/5055.html (last visited
Oct. 14, 2002); Fishbein, supra note 42, at 428, 430; Amital, supra note 42, at 760.
70. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 53, tbl. 2.6; 55, tbl. 2.8.
71. See generally Research Project Notification, supra note 58 at 3 (explaining the steps that were
taken to protect families during the R&M process).
72. Research Project Notification, supra note 58 at 2.
73. BATrELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 60-61, §2.3.1.7.
74. Research Project Notification, supra note 58 at 2.
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Kennedy Krieger research staff interviewed the families living in the identified
homes.75 The purpose of the interview was to determine whether the family and
the home met the study's criteria, including the absence of certain health issues and
the presence of one or more young children, i.e., up to four years of age.76 In
addition, the interviewers assessed the family's interest in participating in the
research study.7
The structure of the houses was evaluated to determine if the houses met the
State's loan requirement for structural soundness.78 If the house was determined to
be structurally unsound, the house and households were not eligible for
participation. 79 During both the pre-enrollment outreach visit and the home visit,
the Kennedy Krieger outreach team reviewed the procedures that would occur if
the family participated in the study, including an explanation of the interventions to
be performed in the home, family education about lead poisoning and lead dust
control, provision of a cleaning kit with instructions on its use, observation of the
home and surrounding for obvious defects, and regular dust and blood lead
testing. 80 There was an extensive consent process. 81 If a family expressed interest
in the study and agreed to participate, the landlord could apply for a loan from the
State to perform the R&M lead reduction interventions in the home.82 If the family
did not agree to participate in the R&M Study, the landlord could still apply for
State loan funds to conduct some form of lead hazard reduction work.83
All of the R&M Level I homes and half of the R&M Level II homes were
occupied when the enrollment process began. 84 Thus, all of these families were
living in non-improved properties.85 Absent the families' enrollment in the study,
and the landlords' participation in the State's Loan Program, the R&M
interventions and related active education and follow-up (including blood lead and
dust lead testing) probably would not have occurred. Therefore, unless these
families' landlords independently had accessed the State's Loan Program, the
families would have continued to live in the non-improved properties.
Prior to the actual R&M interventions, the families were asked to leave the
home for the day or two it took to have the interventions performed by an
75. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 63, §2.3.1.7.
76. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 47, §2.3.1.4.
77. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 60-67, §2.1.3.7.
78. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 §2.3.1.4.
79. See BATrELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 §2.3.1.4.
80. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 60-67, §2.3.1.7.
81. See Farfel, supra note 58 (consent forms for study).
82. Letter from Md. Dep't of Hous. & Comm. Dev., in Research Project Notification,
supra note 58, at App. A.
83. See MD CODE ANN. art. 83B, §2-307 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
84. U.S. EPA, LEAD-BASED PAINT ABATEMENT AND REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE STUDY IN
BALTIMORE: FINDINGS BASED ON Two YEARS OF FOLLOW-UP 25 (EPA No. 747-R-005) (1997).
85. Id. at viii.
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experienced and state certified lead reduction contractor. 86 Thereafter, Kennedy
Krieger research staff would visit the home on a regularly scheduled basis to
perform study-related functions. 87 These included measurement of the dust lead
levels, visual observations of the house, cleaning education, and discussion of lead
dust reduction techniques. 88 Kennedy Krieger assisted families with transportation
to the Kennedy Krieger Clinic where blood samples were collected from the young
children at regular intervals to determine the blood lead level at the time of the
test.
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B. Unoccupied R&M Homes:
One group of homes, labeled R&M 1II, received the most intensive
combination of lead reduction measures. 90 Level III lead reduction methods
included the removal of old windows and the installation of new windows. 9' This
involved a greater degree of disturbance of lead paint and therefore was deemed
safe only for application in vacant housing. 92 Thus, none of the families involved
in the R&M III homes were approached about participation in the study until after
the family had rented a house in which the lead reduction measures had already
been performed by the landlord and contractors. 93  This also was true for the
families that moved into the vacant R&M II homes after the lead reduction
measures had been performed by the landlords and contractors. 94 The research
study procedure was that vacant homes in high-risk areas that fit the structural
soundness criteria for the study would be identified, the landlords would apply for
a State loan to do the work, qualified workmen would perform the work, and then
the landlord would rent the home to families.95 Thereafter, Kennedy Krieger
86. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 52-57, tbls. 2.5- 2.10.
87. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 52-57, tbls. 2.5- 2.10.
88. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 52-57, tbls. 2.5- 2.10.
89. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 1, §3.1.1.1 (Blood); 15-16, §4.2.2
(procedures); 15-17, §2.1.4 (times).
90. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at tbl. 2.10.
91. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at tbl. 2.10.
92. See generally Fischbein, supra note 42; Chisolm, supra note 42; Amitai, supra note 42;
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, supra note 42; Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 38.
93. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 60-65, §2.3.1.7.
94. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 60-65, §2.3.1.7.
95. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 64-65, §2.3.1.7. All the children
in the R&M homes had reportedly spent most or all of their lives living in existing older, low-income
rental housing and thus had been at risk of exposure to lead in dust and paint in their homes and
environment. U.S. EPA, supra note 84, at viii. However, it was theoretically possible that an
unoccupied R&M unit could have been rented to a family who had had no history of living in older,
low-income rental housing. That home would have been rented to a family whether or not the family
ultimately chose to participate in the study. If there was an ethical question of the propriety of allowing
families to move into lead-reduced rather than lead-paint free homes, that ethical question existed for
homes renovated through any lead paint reduction program, not just homes whose landlords accessed
the City's lead reduction loan program.
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contacted families in the rental homes to determine if they wished to participate in
the study.96 If the family agreed to participate, the family received all of the
intervention strategies and active follow-up discussed above.97
C. Previously Abated and New Homes (All Occupied):
The homes previously abated prior to the start of the R&M Study and the
post-1978 newer homes were occupied at the start of the R&M Study, and thus
families were contacted while living in the homes.98 Kennedy Krieger followed
the same consent procedures and primary prevention strategies as described above
for the occupied R&M homes, including explaining steps that the family could take
to reduce any risk of lead exposure. 99 For all study participants in the previously
abated homes and the newer homes, the study involved active follow-up, including
the provision of the MDE pamphlet, ongoing family education, monitoring of
blood and dust lead levels at regular intervals, observation of the house for obvious
defects, and any follow-up deemed necessary as a result of blood level changes or
obvious house defects.
00
V. THE ENROLLEES WERE GIVEN NOTICE OF THE CONTINUING RISK OF LEAD PAINT
ExPOSURE AND THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY:
All families in the R&M Study were advised in discussions and in written
consent documents that they were living in homes or environments that were not
lead free.' 0 ' All the consent forms stated that:
Lead poisoning in children is a problem in Baltimore City and other
communities across the country. Lead in paint, house dust and outside
soil are major sources of lead exposure for children. Children can also
be exposed to lead in drinking water and other sources.'
0 2
In addition, all the families who lived in or would live in the R&M homes
were advised that the R&M repairs are not intended, or expected, to completely
96. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 65.
97. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 tbl. 2.5; 54, tbl. 2.7; 56 tbl. 2.10
(each providing that efforts would be made to increase awareness and knowledge of lead poisoning
among property owners and occupants).
98. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 66-67, §2.3.1.7.
99. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 66-67, §2.3.1.7.
100. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at 66-67, §2.3.1.7.
101. Consent Forms for Study, in MARK FARFEL, RESEARCH PROJECT NOTIFICATION I (No. 91-05-
02-01) (1992) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
102. Consent Forms for Study, in MARK FARFEL, RESEARCH PROJECT NOTIFICATION I (No. 91-05-
02-01) (1992) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
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remove exposure to lead 10 3 and that the special repairs were being done in order to
reduce, not eliminate, exposure to lead in paint and dust. 1°4
All the families in the R&M Study also were advised as to the purposes of the
study, including the fact that there were different levels of repair in the R&M
homes. 10 5 Likewise, all families were advised that the study hoped to learn about
how well these different practices worked for reducing exposure to lead in paint
and dust. 1
06
The families in the R&M homes were advised that they would be in homes
with different levels of repair, and the consent forms for both the occupied
homes, 10 7 and for the unoccupied homes, 10 8 disclosed that two levels of repair and
maintenance were involved. Both forms stated that one purpose of the Study was
to see how well the two levels of repair worked.' 0 9 The determination of which
level of R&M would be used in occupied or unoccupied homes was done on a
random basis.'l ° Because prior studies had not previously used the exact
103. Consent Forms for Study, in MARK FARFEL, RESEARCH PROJECT NOTIFICATION I (No. 91-05-
02-01) (1992) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
104. Consent Forms for Study, in MARK FARFEL, RESEARCH PROJECT NOTIFICATION 1 (No. 91-05-
02-01) (1992) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
105. Consent Forms for Study, in MARK FARFEL, RESEARCH PROJECT NOTIFICATION I (No. 91-05-
02-01) (1992) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
The four consent forms included the following:
The consent form for the occupied homes that received R&M intervention stated that: We are
interested in finding out how well the two levels [Levels I and 11] of repair worked and we
are now doing a study to learn about how well different practices work for reducing exposure
to lead in paint and dust.
The consent form for the unoccupied homes that received R&M interventions stated that: We
are interested in finding out how well the two levels [Levels I and Ill] of repair worked and
we are now doing a study to learn about how well different practices work for reducing
exposure to lead in paint and dust.
The consent form for the previously abated dwellings stated that: We are now doing a study
to learn about how well these and other practices worked and the purpose of the blood lead
level testing is to determine how well the abatement of the lead paint works in keeping young
children's blood lead at low levels.
The consent form for the post-1978 urban dwellings stated that: We are now doing a study to
learn about how well different practices work for reducing exposure to lead in paint and dust
and the purpose of testing for lead in and around a house like yours, and in blood, is to
determine the contribution of non-paint sources to total lead exposure. This will help us learn
more about the role of outside lead sources and whether modern housing alone will keep
blood lead levels at acceptable levels.
106. Consent Forms for Study, in MARK FARFEL, RESEARCH PROJECT NOTIFICATION 1 (No. 91-05-
02-01) (1992) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
107. Consent Forms for Study, in MARK FARFEL, RESEARCH PROJECT NOTIFICATION I (No. 91-05-
02-01) (1992) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
108. Consent Forms for Study, in MARK FARFEL, RESEARCH PROJECT NOTIFICATION I (No. 91-05-
02-01) (1992) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
109. Consent Forms for Study, in MARK FARFEL, RESEARCH PROJECT NOTIFICATION I (No. 91-05-
02-01) (1992) (on file with the Journal of Health Care Law & Policy).
110. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52, at 15, §2.1.4.
[VOL. 6:89
2002] THE LEAD-BASED PAINT ABATEMENT R&M STUDY IN BALTIMORE 103
combinations of methods for dust lead reduction as were used in the three R&M
levels, the Study was designed to measure the effectiveness of those
combinations."' What was known was that, based on prior research, all the
methods applied in the R&M houses were expected to substantially reduce lead in
dust.' 1
2
A. Alternatives to Participation in the R&M Study
The R&M Study involved blood lead testing for all children in the Study.
13
Although it was not necessary to join the study to receive blood lead testing, blood
lead testing for all children was not a requirement of the City, State or federal
government at the time of the Study.1 4 In fact, only approximately one-third of at
risk children in Baltimore City during this period were tested for blood lead
levels." 5 Thus, if a family decided not to participate in the R&M Study, blood
lead level testing would be a matter between the family and the child's health care
provider, if the family had one. Although it was not necessary to join the Study for
a landlord to access the State's loan program, unless a particular landlord did so,
the alternative to participation in the Study for those living in occupied homes
(R&M Levels I & 1I) was to remain in the home without having the repair and
maintenance improvements made. Since the R&M improvements had already
been made to the vacant Level II and III houses before tenants moved in, the
alternative for these families was to move into the homes but decline enrollment in
the Study. The same was true for those occupying the previously abated dwellings
and the newer (post-1978) homes. The only alternative was not to take part in the
Study (thereby foregoing research related blood tests, environmental tests and
family education sessions).
B. The R&M Study Did Not Expose Children to Increased Risk
The involvement of children in the R&M Study included drawing blood to
determine blood lead levels; living in a dwelling that either would undergo or had
undergone lead hazard reduction procedures expected to lower the risk of exposure
to lead in dust and paint; education about lead dust control; and home observation
for obvious structural defects." 6 These activities did not put children at increased
risk.'
17
111. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52, at 1.
112. See Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 44; Farfel et al., supra note 44.
113. See BAITELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52 at §3.1.1.1. See also 52, tbl. 2.5;
54, tbl. 2.7; 56 tbl. 2.10.
114. U.S. DEP'T OF HHS, supra note 4, at 15.
115. MDE SUMMARY, supra note 23.
116. See generally BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52.
117. See generally Fischbein, supra note 43; Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 43; Farfel & Chisolm,
supra note 44; Farfel et al., supra note 44.
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The R&M interventions in the homes, based on prior research, were expected
to lower the risk of lead poisoning for occupants of the R&M homes."18 (See for
example, Drs. Farfel and Chisolm's Report on a Pilot Project where the
experimental dust lead reductions to the floors, window sills and window wells
were reported to be 89.3%, 91.1% and 96.6% respectively, over the follow-up test
period."19 Based on the reported housing histories of the families in the R&M
Study, all the children in the R&M homes had spent most or all of their lives living
in existing older, low-income rental housing and thus had been at risk of exposure
to lead in dust and paint in their homes and in their environment. 120  This is
consistent with the fact that approximately ninety-five percent of the then available
housing stock in Baltimore City had been built prior to 1978 and the fact that low-
income housing was high-risk housing due to poor maintenance. 12 1 Accordingly,
any family living in an unimproved home was already at risk for lead poisoning
and could expect to benefit from the R&M Study interventions. Likewise, any
family moving into an improved home would be moving into safer housing than
approximately 95% of the options then available to low income families in high-
risk neighborhoods in Baltimore City.' 22 Because families would have moved into
all of these homes, with or without the Study, the Study itself did not expose the
children to an increased risk of exposure to lead.
As mentioned above, the Study included two comparison groups, i.e., the
families in the comprehensively abated homes, and the families in the post-1978
homes.123 A control or a comparison group could be included in the Study because
monitoring children living in the previously abated or new homes did not place
children at an increased risk.124 Even though a benefit to participants was hot
required in order to include control groups in the Study, there were several
benefits, such as blood testing and education, to those participants.'
25
118. Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 44; Farfel et al., supra note 44.
119. Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 44, at 199.
120. U.S. EPA, supra note 84, at viii.
121. U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at 3-6, 3-32; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, supra note 20.
122. U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at 3-6, 3-32; CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, supra note 20.
123. BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52, at 66-67, §2.3.1.7.
124. See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS POL'Y STATEMENT, GUIDELINES FOR ETHICAL CONDUCT OF
STUDiES TO EVALUATE DRUGS IN PEDIATRIC POPULATIONS (RE 9503) (Vol. 95, No. 2 at 286-94) (1995);
NIH, OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL RES., QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE NIH POL'Y AND
GUIDELINES ON THE INCLUSION OF CHILDREN AS PARTICIPANTS IN RES. INVOLVING HUM. SUBJECTS,
§21 (1999), available at http//grants2.nih.gov/grants/funding/children/pol-children qa.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2002).
125. Research Project Notification, supra note 58, at 4. The court in Grimes criticized the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) for trying to characterize the R&M Study as of benefit to the
members of the control group in order to make inclusion of a control group acceptable under the federal
regulations. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 817. The IRB may have wanted to emphasize the prospect of
benefits to normal individuals through enrollment in the study. However, because the study did not
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As mentioned above, the protocol eligibility requirements included families
with children under four years of age.' 26 Because lead poisoning was a problem in
very young children, the Study was targeted at high-risk housing that would be
occupied by families with children. 127  Previous research showed that
interventions, such as those employed in the R&M study homes, as well as in
previously abated homes, would offer the expectation of reduced lead situations
from those available in non-improved homes; 128 therefore it was appropriate to
target these homes and the families that lived or moved into these homes for
inclusion in the Study. Although the court in Grimes inferred that a study of the
relative effectiveness of these lead hazard reductions methods was unethical, 129 the
court was not presented with the context of the lead problem or the complete
design of the study. Based on a full understanding of the daunting problem of lead
in the overwhelming majority of housing stock in these high-risk neighborhoods,
the prior studies which supported an expectation of lead dust reduction in all of the
R&M homes, the disclosures made to the families in the study, and the protections
built into the study for ongoing education and blood and dust monitoring, the
Study design was both appropriate and ethical.
130
increase the risk to participants, it was not necessary for there to be any direct benefit to members of the
control group in order to include the control group in the R&M Study. See NIH, supra note 124.
126. Research Project Notification, supra note 58, at 1.
127. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52, at 47-48, §2.3.1.4.
128. See generally Farfel & Chisolm, supra note 44; Farfel et al., supra note 44.
129. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 848; see supra text accompanying note 10.
130. See NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUM. SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL &
BEHAVIORAL RES., THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUM. SUBJECTS OF RES. (GPO PUB. No. 887-809) (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT
REPORT]. The Belmont Report established three fundamental ethical principles relevant to research
involving human subjects -respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Id. at 5-8. The R&M Study
design demonstrates a respect for persons in that there was an extensive consent process which
informed families about the continuing problem of lead poisoning, the purpose of the study, the
interventions that would occur and the process for ongoing monitoring. See Consent Forms for R&M
Study, in Research Project Notification, supra note 58. The enrollees were given notice of the
continuing risk of lead paint exposure. See Research Project Notification, supra note 58. The R&M
Study design demonstrates beneficence in that every intervention had an expectation of reducing lead
dust risk. See generally BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52. Any risks of the study
were minimized and the benefits were maximized. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra
notes 52, 58. Kennedy Krieger focused the research in the highest risk areas where lead poisoning was
a known risk for families. U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at 2-19. These high risk homes contained
lead paint and had lead levels exceeding Maryland's post-abatement clearance levels. BATTELLE &
KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52, at 45, §2.3.1.3; 47-48, §2.3.1.4. This philosophy was
reinforced by the State loan program requirements that loans be made only to those owners of units that
serve families at or below 50% of the statewide median income. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER
INST., supra note 52, at App. A. The R&M Study design demonstrates justice in that there was fair
selection and treatment of participants. See discussion supra under the textual heading: R&M Study
Did Not Discriminate, text accompanying notes 116-30. In addition, the R&M Study was designed to
address a serious health problem affecting the high-risk community from which the study population
was drawn. See COUNCIL FOR INTERN'L ORGANIZATIONS OF MEDICAL SCIS. (CIOMS), ETHICS AND
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C. The R&M Study Did Not Discriminate
All of the participants in the study were African-American. 13 1  The
demographic composition of the participants in the R&M Study was not by design
but rather a function of the Study's effort to target the highest-risk neighborhoods
for improvement. 32 Various federal agencies had determined that families in
older, poorer neighborhoods where housing was more likely to be in deteriorating
condition were at highest risk for lead poisoning.' 33 City Homes, a non-profit
organization which owned low-income rental units in Baltimore, and which had
already adopted a lead poisoning prevention policy for its homes in 1991, was the
primary source of the R&M dwellings.134 City Homes and the other landlords who
referred houses to Kennedy Krieger owned many homes in the higher risk, low-
income areas of the City, which had a predominantly African-American
population. 3 5 Because the study used methods which were expected to reduce the
risk of lead poisoning by reducing exposure to residential lead, it was appropriate
to conduct the study in high-risk neighborhoods where the homes had not been
improved.
D. The Results of the R&M Study
The R&M lead reduction measures resulted in significant and sustained
reductions in the overall lead dust levels for all the R&M combinations of property
treatments. 36 Although in some individual cases blood lead levels did increase,
overall, children in each of the three R&M groups and the previously abated group
who had a baseline lead concentration of over 15 .tg/dL (above the 10 gg/dL CDC
level of concern) had a statistically significant reduction in blood lead
concentration during follow-up, after controlling for age, gender, and season.
137
Overall, children who were in the three R&M groups who had baseline blood
concentrations of under 15 gg/dL had a statistically significant reduction in blood
lead concentration over time, when controlling for age, gender and season.
38
RES. ON HUM. SUBJECTS, INTERN'L GUIDELINES (Proceedings of the XXVIth CIOMS Conference,
Guideline 10: Equitable Distribution of Burdens and Benefits) (1992).
131. U.S. EPA, supra note 84, at viii.
132. BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52, at 45, §2.3.1.3; 47-48, §2.3.1.4.
133. U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at 2-16, 2-19 to 2-20.
134. See BATrELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52, at 2.
135. See BATTELLE & KENNEDY KRIEGER INST., supra note 52, at 48-49, app. G, § 3.
136. U.S. EPA, supra note 84, at xiii-xv.
137. U.S. EPA, supra note 84, at xiii-xv.
138. U.S. EPA, supra note 84, at xiii-xv.
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E. Other Federal Studies:
In 1993 and 1994, in keeping with the national call for additional research
into the effectiveness of lead reduction strategies, 139 the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) awarded funds under its Lead-Based Paint Hazard
Control Grant Program to 30 grant recipients in 14 cities, states, and counties,
including Baltimore.
140
The design of the HUD study was, in many ways, similar to that of the R&M
study. 14 1 HUD encouraged grantees to implement lead hazard control measures of
their choice in the study properties, and different classes of interventions were used
within each grantee's study.1 4 2 These included various interior interventions, such
as spot painting/cleaning; complete painting; window treatments; window
abatement; and full abatement. 14 3  Some exterior and soil treatments were also
included.' 44 The grantees were to measure the dust lead levels in the homes and
blood lead levels of children in the homes before and after the interventions, and
were to compare these for the different levels of interventions. 14 5 Thus, HUD fully
supported and encouraged research using designs similar to the R&M Study.
F. Actions of Government Based on the Results of the R&M Study
The R&M Study was influential in bringing national recognition to the value
of safe and effective lead reduction measures as tools necessary to prevent lead
poisoning. Many of these measures have been incorporated in state and local laws,
including Maryland's 1994 law requiring lessors of residential property to (i)
register each rental unit built before 1950 with a statewide rental registry; (ii)
notify tenants of the risks of exposure to lead and their rights under the law; and
(iii) certify that the risk reduction standard was met at the time of unit turnover
either by repair and cleaning of the rental property or by passing a dust lead test.
146
The State's mandatory requirements for lead risk reduction were similar to the
139. U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 3, at xv, xvi, xxii; U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, supra note 4, at xv-7.
140. Warren Galke et al., Evaluation of the HUD Lead Hazard Control Grant Program: Early
Overall Findings, 2001 SCI. RES. & PROGRAM EVALUATIONS 150 (2001),
http://www.centerforhealthyhousing.org/early overallfindings.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2002). Over
2,600 treated dwellings were involved in the study. Id. at 150. Although the program results showed a
significant reduction in the dust and blood lead levels overall, the 2001 report on the study does not yet
reflect the effects of the different intensities of treatments, and the authors of the report expect there to
be some variation. Id. at 155. All thirty grantees' IRBs reviewed and approved participation in the
study. Id. at 150.
141. Id. at 155.
142. Id. at 151.
143. Id. at 152.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. The Lead Poisoning Prevention Program Act, MD. CODE ANN., [ENVIR.], §§6-801-852
(2001); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26 § 16.02.03 (1996).
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Level I and 1I R&M interventions. 147 Many of these measures also have been
incorporated in HUD's lead-safety regulation for federally owned and federally




Whether proactive preventive lead reduction procedures should be performed
in existing homes is a public policy debate. The Maryland Court of Appeals in
Grimes did not discuss or recognize this situation, nor did it have before it
evidence of the prior research which formed the framework for the study. The
study, when fully understood, was both appropriate and ethical for those
participating in the study, and made significant contributions to the science of lead
reduction standards. As the public debate regarding lead reduction continues, it is
important that the facts regarding the study be known and the context of prevention
research in this important area be understood.
147. See MD. REGS. CODE tit. 26, §§16.02.01 - 16.02.07 (1996); See also BATTELLE & KENNEDY
KRIEGER INST., supra note 52, at 58-59, tbl. 2.11.
148. See 24 C.F.R. § 35 (1999).
149. See U.S. DEP'T OF HUD, GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION AND CONTROL OF LEAD-BASED
PAINT HAZARDS IN HOUSING (June 1995).
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